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ABSTRACT
Terrorism only poses a small risk to people but tends to be a major
source of public fear. Through fear, terrorism has far-reaching impli-
cations for public governance. ln this paper we look at trust in
government as a potential mitigating factor of fear of terrorism. We
discern between calculative trust, based on analytical assessment of
previous and expected future actions, and relational trust, based on
emotions and perceived value similarity with government. We find
that relational trust decreases fear of terrorism. A similar but less
robust negative relationship exists between calculative trust and
fear. However, our regression analyses suggest that relational trust,
in fact, may mediate the relationship between calculative trust and
fear of terrorism. ln other words, the more citizens think government
is able to prevent terrorist attack and feel that authorities are doing
enough, the more they, in turn, feel that their government shares
their values, and the less fearful they are of future terrorist attacks.
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Terrorism only poses a small risk of victimization but tends to be a major source of public
fear. Through fear, terrorism has far-reaching implications for public governance. Fear of
attacks not only changes citizen behavior in public spaces, but also poses a "real physical 25
danger" as citizens-paradoxically-engage in riskier activities.l A famous example of this
mechanism includes the substantial increase in the number of fatal highway crashes in the
United States in the year following the 9/11 attacks. While driving is much riskier than
flyttg, many Americans decided to drive rather than to fly after the attacks. The casualties
of the highway crashes can be viewed as an extreme example of the "indirect damages of 30
terrorism, mediated through our minds."' Othe. examples include increased stress levels
and concomitant health issues3 and the costs of additional security measures in response
to public fear.a
Despite its well-known effects on public health, safety, and finances, we still know little
about how fear of terrorism can be mitigated. Studies of security measures installed after 35
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terrorist attacks show that such measures may be ineffective in reducing fears or even
increase citizens' feelings of insecurity.6 We rely on the literature on risk perceptions to
argue that building trust in government could be a more promising way to mitigate
citizens' fear of terrorism. The political science literature has already dealt with the
relationship between trust in government and fear of terrorism.t However, both theory 40
and empirics have focused on the question of how fear of terrorism influences trust in
government, rather than the other way around.s Moreover, trust has generally been
treated as a unidimensional concept, obfuscating much of the complexity of the
construct.e The goal of this article is to address these limitations.
In terms of theory we draw on the literature on risk perceptions to conceptualize trust and 45
specify our hypotheses. This body ofliterature has already extensively reflected on the role trust
in authorities plays in mitigating the perceived risks of various hazards.lo As risk perceptions and
fear are closely related empirically,ll we are able to use these insights to theorize how trust in
government could affect fear. In terms of empirics, we make use of a unique survey administered
among a representative sample of the Dutch population in November 2017 (N = 1,077). In 50
contrast to many existing studies, this survey allows us to examine both of the two dimensions
commonly attributed to trust: its calculative dimension, based on analytical thinking, or matters
of the mind, concerned with expected future actions, and its relational dimension, or matters of
the heart, based on emotions and perceived value similarity with a trustee.
Furthermore, our case selection provides analytical leverage to study how trust in govern- 55
ment affects fear of terrorism. Preceding studies focus on countries in which a terrorist attack
recently occurred.l2 Terrorist attacks evoke unusually high levels of fear among the public
which makes it likely that citizens abruptly put their trust in government in order to reduce
feelings of uncertainty.l3 This increases the likelihood of observing a reversed relationship-
that is, fear influencing trust rather than the other way around. By contrast, in situations where 60
no recent terrorist attacks have occurred, such as in the Netherlands, we may expect it to be
Ieast lkely that citizens' fear of terrorism drives their trust in government.
Studies in various countries suggest that increased trust in government after terrorist
attacks is only short-lived.l4 The pattern of a steep increase followed by a quick return to
levels of trust before a terrorist attack has been documented not only in the United States 65
after 9lll but also in Spain after the 2004 train bombings in Madrid and in Belgium after
the 2014 shooting in Brussels.lt This is also in line with evolutionary theory: "indivi-
duals ... turn more towards those seen as being in protective roles during periods of
heightened threat."r6 In other words, only in the exceptional cases in which people
experience an immediate threat (such as after a terrorist attack) do they "seek protection 70
from a stronger, tougher resource" such as their government.lT Combined with the
aforementioned empirical findings that show a quick return to standard levels of trust
after terrorist attacks, this strengthens our conviction that in a context of "politics as
usual"l8 we are able to observe the influence of trust on fear instead of the reverse.
Our results show that relational trust decreases fear of terrorism. We find a similar but less 75
robust negative relationship between calculative trust and fear of terrorism. However, our
analyses suggest that relational trust, in fact, mediates the relationship between calculative
trust and fear of terrorism. In other words, the more citizens think the government is able to
prevent terrorist attacks and feel the government is doing enough, the more they, in turn, feel
that the government shares their values, and the less fearful they are of becoming a victim of 80
future terrorist attacks.
TERRORTSM AND POL|TICAL VTOLENCE @ 3
In the following, we first review the risk perception literature regarding trust in
government. This allows us to specifr our hlpotheses regarding fear of terrorism in the
subsequent section. Afterwards, we present our methodology and the results. We conclude
with a brief discussion on the implications for government counterterrorism policy and 85
goYernment risk communication.
Theoretical expectations
Two dimensions of trust
We define trust as "a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based
upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another" [emphasis added].re This 90
definition reflects the academic consensus that trust has two dimensions: calculative and
relational.20 Calculative trust is based on an assessment of past performance and relies on
consecutive inferences about the future.2l It refers to "the belief, based on experience or
evidence (e.g., past performance), that certain future events will occur as expected."22 By
contrast, relational trust is meant "to reduce complexity through the acceptance of risk," 95
regardless of the consequences.'3 It does not so much rely on expected future actions but
rather "on a judgment of similarity of intentions or values."2a This makes relational trust
a function of social identification instead of instrumentulity.'u
These dimensions of trust reflect the two fundamental ways of thinking referred to in
cognitive psychology as the rational and the experiential system.26 The former is slow and 100
analytic, driven by evidence and logic; the latter is quick and unreflective, driven by associa-
tions and emotions. We therefore view calculative trust as mostly a matter of "the head" (i.e.,
rationality) and relational trust as a matter of "the heart" (i.e., emotions).27 The differences
between the two types of trust may have far-reaching implications for how we understand the
relationship between trust in government and people's fear of terrorist attacks. 105
Risk perceptions and trust in government
Trust in government has already been extensively studied with regard to risk perceptions.
Risk perceptions and fear are closely related empirically.2s Therefore, we draw on insights
from the risk perception literature to specify our hlpotheses on the relationship between
trust in government and fear of terrorism. We first provide a brief overview of the 110
respective body of literature.
In general, both types of trust are important to explain risk perceptions.'e In a recent review
on natural hazards, Gisela Wachinger and colleagues conclude that "[in] addition to personal
experience, the second most important factors for risk perception of natural hazards ... are
trust in scientific experts and authorities [i.e. relational trust] and confidence in protective lt5
measures [i.e. calculative trust]."3O Both types of trust seem similarly important correlates of
perceived risk with regard to technological hazards.3l Furthermore, both trust types appear to
suppress perceived risks: existing studies consistently show a significant negative relationship
between trust and citizens' risk perceptions across a wide variety of hazards.32
In line with these overall findings, studies examining the two dimensions of trust separately 120
(or only one of the two) point into the same direction. To illustrate, in his study of risk
perceptions related to floods in the Netherlands, Teun Terpstra33 shows how trust in public
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flood defenses and risk management (i.e., calculative trust) significantly reduced risk percep-
tions among Dutch citizens, both with regard to the perceived likelihood of a flood and that of
becoming a victim. Similar results are reported in studies of technological hazards,3a including 125
nuclear waste and power35 and genetically-modified food.36
Relational trust in government and/or involved authorities appears to similarly decrease
the risks people associate with various hazards, including hazardous waste disposal,3T
nuclear power,3t and electromagnetic fields.3e Note that while these studies may use
different targets of perceived risk (e.g., risk to oneself, to others, or in general), in the 130
end, they all tend to formulate some version of the following conclusion: the more people
trust authorities, the less risk they associate with the relevant hazard.ao
The risk literature tends to explain the comparable patterns across the two dimensions
of trust in government by arguing that the affective relationship between the trustor and
the trustee (the basis of relational trust) influences the evaluation of the trustee's perfor- 135
mance (the basis of calculative trust).ar However, empirical evidence tends to be restricted
to observational data collected at one point in time.a2 Finding a positive relationship
between the two types of trust for the case of genetically-modified food, Wouter Poortinga
and Nick Pidgeon therefore more cautiously conclude that "[w]hile the results suggest that
the proposed model is a plausible one, more systematic (experimental) research is needed 140
to clarify the direction of the relationships."43 Put differently, while risk perception
research often assumes that relational trust influences calculative trust, it may equally be
the case that these studies' correlational findings imply that calculative trust influences
relational trust instead.
In sum, whereas the existing body of literature provides consistent evidence that trust 145
in government and other trustees is associated with lower perceived risks across a wide
range of hazards, the empirical evidence remains thin with regard to how its two dimen-
sions relate to each other. Based on this discussion, we now turn to our expectations
regarding the relationship between trust in government and fear of terrorism.
Fear of terrorism and trust in government 150
The question arises how both forms of trust in government matter for explainin g fear of
terrorism. We define fear of terrorism as an individual's anxiety about future terrorist
attacks.a Most terrorism researchers will agree that terror by definition is intended to
evoke an emotional response among the public in order to attain political ends.as
Although terrorist attacks occur infrequently, their potentially high impact and the 155
emotional response they tend to evoke makes people likely to overestimate their risk,
whilst neglecting the actual improbability of an attack.a6
As terrorism is associated with strong emotions and high uncertainty, we may expect
most people to respond to it on the basis of experiential rather than analytical thinking.aT
This makes relational trust in government a potentially strong predictor of people's fear of 160
terrorism. For it suggests that people will not base their response on rational evaluations,
but rather on cognitive shortcuts such as value similarity in order to reduce uncertainty.as
Given the consistent evidence that relational trust in government reduces risk perceptions,
this may mean that the more people feel that government shares their values, the less risk
they associate with terrorism and the less fearful they are. This leads to our first 165
hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 1: The more relational trust citizens have in government, the less fearful
they are of terrorism.
However, we know from the risk perception literature discussed above that calculative 170
trust matters too for how citizens respond to risk. Findings, however, are not conclusive:
A survey conducted by Marcos Misis and colleaguesae among undergraduate students in
the United States corroborates the negative relationship between calculative trust in
government and fear of terrorism. They show that better performance evaluations of the
government and domestic intelligence agencies with regard to counterterrorism were 175
related to less fear of future terrorist attacks occurring in the U.S. Similarly, Samuel
Sinclair and Alice LoCicero also find a positive relationship between fear of terrorism
and calculative trust in government.so By contrast, a study conducted by Shelly McArdle
and colleaguessr showed no significant relationship between confidence in the
U.S. government to prevent future terrorist attacks and concerns about victimization or 180
the occurrence of another major terrorist attack in the United States. Given the indications
for calculative responses mentioned here and the consistent evidence in the risk percep-
tion literature that calculative trust matters, we still speci$' the second hypothesis as
follows:
Hypothesis 2: The more calculative trust citizens have in government, the less fearful 185
they are of terrorism.
As we pointed out in the preceding section, how the two types of trust relate to each
other remains less clear than most of the risk perceptions literature suggests. Risk
perception studies suggest that the effect ofrelational trust on fear ofterrorism is mediated 190
by calculative trust.s2 In other words, relational trust ("the government shares my values")
is expected to increase calculative trust ("the government is doing a good job in preventing
terrorist attacks"), which, in turn, would decrease people's fear of terrorism. However, not
only do we lack empirical evidence to verifr this, we also have good theoretical reasons to
suggest that relational trust may be the mediating variable. That is to say, when citizens are 195
convinced that the government performs well, they will, in turn, be more likely to think it
also has the right intentions and shares their values.s3 This is in line with the literature on
policy feedback suggesting that policy performance impacts citizens' broader orientations
towards politics.s It follows that how citizens judge what the government is doing (the
basis of calculative trust) is likely to "feed back" into how they view their overall relation- 200
ship with government (the basis of relational trust). This is why we deliberately remain
agnostic with regard to potential mediation effects. We therefore speciS' two competing
mediation hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3: Calculative trust mediates the relationship between relational trust and
fear of terrorism. ZOs
Hypothesis 4: Relational trust mediates the relationship between calculative trust and
fear of terrorism.
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Data and methods 210
Dato
We use data from an online representative survey conducted in the Netherlands among
1,400 members of the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social sciences (LISS) panel
(November 6-28,2017).su The LISS panel is based on a true probability sample of the Dutch
population and is commonly used in social science research.56 The present survey was part 215
of a larger study on risk perceptions and communication related to terrorism threat for the
Research and Documentation Centre of the Dutch Ministry of |ustice and Security
(Reference omitted to ensure blind review). The survey had a non-response rate of 23o/o,
resulting in a final sample of 1,077 respondents. The sample is largely representative of the
Dutch population in terms of common background characteristics such as sex, age, educa- 220
tion, and parents' country of origin (Online Appendix A).
At the time the survey was administered, no terrorist attacks had recently occurred in
the Netherlands. Even though various authors have suggested that fear of terrorism may
not only result from the (indirect) experience of an attack, but also from the exposure to
political rhetoric and media stories,sT we find no clear signs for such tendencies in the 225
Netherlands at the time. The Online Appendix reflects that parliamentary and media
attention for terrorism remained at stable levels throughout the study period. Further,
survey data gathered by the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism
(NCTV) and the Eurobarometer suggest that the public's level of fear remained constant
as well (Online Appendix B). These observations make it unlikely that political speeches or 230
media stories caused a sudden increase in fear of terrorism among Dutch citizens. This
assures us that the Dutch context in November 2017 can be characterized as "politics as
usual"58 rather than "an atmosphere of fear and alarm."5e
Operationalizations
Dependent Variable 235
Table 1 displays the operationalization of the variables included in the analyses. The depen-
dent variable (Fear ofterrorism) refers to respondents' worries about terrorism because this
tends to solicit responses about their "anxiety about future victimizations" rather than their
"sense of an immediate threat."6o The focus on worries thereby fits our research objective of
explaining anxiety about terrorism more generally.6l It is measured by the survey item: "To 240
what extent do you worry about the possibility that you or (someone from) your family will be
a victim of a terrorist attack?" The initial four-point scale (1 = Not worried, 2 = A little
worried, 3 = Very worried, 4 = Extremely worried) is recoded into the three-point scale
reported in Table l, merging the highest two categories given that option 4 (extremely
worried) only contained 16 responses. 245
lndependent Variables
For the operationalization of Relational trust we cannot rely on a common multi-item
scale as used in other work,62 but instead rely on a single item as a proxy of relational
trust: general trust in government. Respondents were asked how much they trust the
Dutch government on a scale from I (do not trust at all) to tO (trust very much). This 250
question has the analytical advantage of being distinct from the items we employ for
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Table 1. Operationalization and descriptive statistics.












3 Worries about the possibility of oneself or a family member
becoming a victim of a terrorist attack. 1 = Not wonied, 2 = A little
wonied, 3 = Very worried.
10 Trust in government. 1 = No trust at all, 10 = A lot of trust.
5 Composite index of three items (described in telt).
1 Average self-reported knowledge of counterterrorism measures and
terrorism threat communications issued by the government.
0 = Not familiar, 1 = At least a little familiar.
4 Average fear of 8 disasters occurring in The Netherlands. 1 = Not
fearful, 2 = A little fearful, 3 = Fearful, 4 = Very fearful,
1 Sex.0=Male, 1 =Female.
91 Age in years.
'10.5 Net monthly income in thousands of Euros.
1 Secondary education as highest level of completed education.
0=No,1=Yes.
1 Higher vocational or university education as highest level of
completed education. 0 = No, 1 = Yes.
1 Both parents born in The Netherlands.0 = No, 1 = Yes.
1 Marital status. 0 = Not married, 1 = Manied.
9 Number of people in household (max. = 9).
9 Number of children in household (max. = 9).
1 Unemployed.0=No, 1 =Yes.
1 Declared Christian.0 = No, 1 = Yes.
1 DeclaredMuslim.0= No, I=Yes.
5 Population density of respondent's place of residence (postal
addresses/km2).1 =< 500,2 = 500-1,000,3 = 1,000-1,500,
4 = 1,500-2,500, 5 = > 2,500.
1 lnternet as one of the most frequent news sources (social media,








































calculative trust (discussed below), that is, "trust in institutions is asked without reference
to the performance of institutions or their occupants."63
Furthermore, relational trust is strongly correlated with how much people identify with the
parties in government. People who intended to vote for a political party in government when the 255
survey was administered tended to show higher relational trust in government (r = 0.40, p
< .001). When one views this expression of political support as an indicator of value similarity
between the respondent and the government, this correlation suggests that the general measure
of trust in government indeed seems to specifically tap respondents' relational trust in govern-
ment. This is further supported by the findings that this measure ofvalue similarity correlates less 260
strongly with trust in other institutions as well as with our measure of Calculative trrcf (Online
Appendix C). These findings taken together underpin the discriminant validity of our measure&:
related variables correlate less strongly with value similarity than Relational trust.
Calculative trust is measured by asking respondents about the government's ability and
performance regarding counterterrorism.6s Following Misis et a1.,66 the former is captured 265
by two questions: one on prevention of terrorist attacks (i.e., "To what extent do you think
the Dutch government is able to prevent a terrorist attack?") and one on the mitigation of
the potential consequences of attacks (i.e., "To what extent do you think the Dutch
government is able to constrain the consequences of a terrorist attack?"). Perceived
performance is measured by asking respondents about the sufficiency of the government's 270
actions6T: "To what extent do you think the Dutch government does enough to prevent
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aterroristattack?"(i=Not,2=Barely,3=Reasonably,4=Sufficiently,5=Well).All
three questions were asked conjointly and the order of the questions was not randomized.
As the three items correlate strongly6s and show high reliability (Cronbach's alpha = 0.82),
we combine the three measures into a composite index of Calculative trust. We adjust the 27 5
item scores for their relative loadings on the underlying dimension of calculative trust.
The loadings are derived from an exploratory factor analysis (Online Appendix C).
Control Variables
Citizens' fear of terrorism as well as their assessment of government performance likely depends
on how much (they think) they know about counterterrorism measures implemented by the 280
government.6e To control for this, we rely on the following question: "To what extent are you
familiar with the following: (a) The fact that the government distributes information about
counterterrorism; (b) The website www.crisis.nl with information about whatyou can do during
a disaster or crisis, such as a terrorist attack; (c) The activities of the National Coordinator for
Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV); (d) The current threat level of the Terrorist Threat 285
Assessment Netherlands (DTNX" (l = Yes, familiar, 2 = A little familiar, 3 = No, not familiar,
4 = Not applicable). The responses are recoded to 1 when the respondent indicated to be at least
a little familiar with the respective topic (all other responses are set to 0). As the four items show
an acceptable level of reliability (Cronbach's alpha = 0.73), we average the responses to create the
measnre Knowledge. 290
In addition, how fearful citizens are in general tends to correlate positively with their
fear of terrorism.T0 To the extent that it captures fear related to previous instances of crisis,
general fear may also be related to trust. If one argues that earlier crises affect both trust
and fear of terrorism, by controlling for general fear, we explicitly deal with this con-
founder. We control for general fear by relying on eight survey items that asked respon- 295
dents how fearful they are of the occurrence of various disasters: "How fearful are you that
in the Netherlands the following will take place?" (1 = not fearful, 2 = a little fearful,
3 = fearful, 4 = ye|y fearful).71 As the items show high reliability (Cronbach's alpha = 0.86),
we average the scores to construct an index of General fear.
Lastly, we control for socio-economic background characteristics commonly included 300
in studies of fear of terrorism.T2 Most of these characteristics are included in models that
attempt to explain trust in government.T3 We therefore account for the possible variance
that might be related to these background factors rather than to the relationship between
the variables of interest (i.e., trust in government and fear).
Statistical procedures 305
We test hlpotheses I and2 by means of multiple ordered logit models, as the dependent
variable Fear is measured on an ordinal three-point scale. For hypotheses 3 and 4, we rely
on the most common approach to mediation analysis: the causal steps approach.Ta We
estimate the models for the mediation analysis by means of ordered logit models for the
outcomevariable Fearof terrorism andbymeansof ordinaryleastsquares(OtS)forthe 310
two models explaining the potential mediators (Calculative trust and Relational trust).In
the analyses presented here, we exclude cases with missing values, leading to a final sample
of 810 cases in the most elaborate multiple regression model.
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In addition to the main analyses, we perform a series of robustness checks. First, given
recent criticism of the causal steps approach to mediation analysis,Ts we verifr our results 315
by calculating the average causal mediation effect (ACME) as suggested by Kosuke Imai,
Luke Keele, Dustin Tingley, and Teppei YamamotoT6 making use of the mediation
package in the R software environment.TT We show that this produces substantively
similar results (Online Appendix D).
Next, we estimate our models with respondents' fear of an attack happening in another 320
country as the dependent variable. As one would expect, both types of trust in government
do not relate significantly to respondents'concerns for attacks abroad when the various
controls are taken into consideration. This enhances our confidence in the validity of our
trust measures. We also run models with different specifications for calculative trust.
These by and large confirm the main results (Online Appendix C). 325
What is more, a key assumption of ordered logit models is that the regression
coefficients are equal across the levels of the dependent variable. We therefore estimate
models for which we a) partially and b) completely relax this assumption (Online
Appendix E). This does not lead to substantially different results.
Furthermore, as excluding cases from the analyses could potentially lead to different 330
results, we also run models which minimize the number of missing cases (Online
Appendix C) as well as models that instead rely on the lowest number of cases observed
across the models reported here (online Appendix F). Finally, we run models with
additional controls (Online Appendix F) as well as models with weights included for
key demographic variables to adjust for over- and under-sampling (Online Appendix A). 335
All in all, the results point towards similar substantive conclusions.
Results
Table 2 summarizes the results for the ordered logit models that seek to explain citizens'
fear of terrorism. The fit of the models is comparable to other statistical models relying on
survey data to explain fear of terrorism.Ts
Table 2. Ordered loqit regression models explaininq fear of terrorism.
340





























































































Note. Ordered logit regression coefficients with z statistics in parentheses.
* p <.1, ** p <.05, *** p <.01
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Turning to the hypotheses, we first of all find strong support for Hypothesis l:
relational trust in government significantly reduces citizens' fear of terrorism. The effect
is also substantial in size. When we account for all control variables (Model 6), a one-point
increase on the ten-point scale of relational trust leads to a 10% decrease in the odds of
someone being fearful of terrorism. We can interpret this change in odds as a measure of 345
the reduced likelihood of someone reporting a higher level on the fear of terrorism
variable (i.e., a little fearful vs. not fearful, or very fearful vs. a little fearful). To illustrate,
the odds of someone being a little fearful of terrorism instead of not fearful are about 45%
higher for someone with absolutely no relational trust in government (score of 1)
compared to someone with average relational trust in government (score of 5.5). 350
We find weaker evidence for Hypothesis 2. While calculative trust in government
appears to significantly reduce the odds of someone being fearful of terrorism, even
when all controls are added (Model 5), it loses significance when also relational trust is
added to the model (Model6).
Turning to Hypotheses 3 and 4, the steps approach to mediation analysis provides 355
support only for Hypothesis 4. That is, relational trust appears to mediate the relationship
between calculative trust and fear of terrorism. This is substantiated by the following
findings. First, calculative trust significantly reduces fear ofterrorism when relational trust
is not taken into consideration (Model 5). Next, it has a significant positive relationship
with relational trust (B = I.I2, p < .001) (full model not reported here). Finally, it loses 360
significance once relational trust is added to the model (Model 6). In fact, the insignif-
icance of calculative trust and the fact that its absolute value is very close to zero suggest
that relational trust completely mediates the effect of calculative trust on fear of terrorism.
The lack of significance of calculative trust in the full model (Model 6) indicates a lack of
support for Hypothesis 3. Substantively, these results suggest that the more citizens trust 365
in the government's ability and performance regarding counterterrorism, the more they
feel the government has the right intentions and, in turn, the less fearful they are that they
themselves or their family will be a victim of future terrorist attacks.
As shown in Figure 1, two of the control variables are also significantly related to fear
of terrorism. In the full model with all controls included (Model 6), the odds of women 370
being fearful of terrorism are 82.4o/o higher than those of men (B = 0.60, p < .001).
Furthermore, a one-point increase in respondents' average fear of other hazards (mea-
sured on a four-point scale) is associated with 7.3 times higher odds of being fearful of
terrorism (B = 1.98, p < .001). These findings are in line with previous studies on risk
perception. 375
Discussion
Our findings confirm that trust in government is negatively associated with fear of
terrorism and add to the literature that some forms of trust matter more than others.
Citizens' general trust in government consistently mitigates fear of terrorism; their trust in
the effectiveness of government counterterrorism policy matters less. More precisely, and 380
perhaps counterintuitively, matters of the head (calculative trust) seem to affect matters of
the heart (relational trust) in how much citizens fear a terrorist attack. The good news is
that building trust could be an effective way to tackle public fear of terrorism-something
that extra security measures do not always appear to achieve.Te As Timothy Earle, Michael
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Figure 1. Ordered logistic regression coefficients explaining fear of terrorism
Siegrist, and Heinz Gutscher note, "if we understood trust, and if we could affect levels of 385
trust, then we might also be able to affect levels of risk perception," and, we may add,
levels of fear.so
In this study, we have tried to assess the influence of trust on fear by studying citizens'
fear of terrorism in a national context where no recent terrorist attacks have occurred.
Whereas most of the literature on fear of terrorismsl looks at countries with recent 390
experiences of terrorist attacks (such as Canada, France, Israel, Norway, United States),
the survey we used was conducted in the Netherlands, where the last successful terrorist
attack took place in 2004. In addition to introducing a new context, studying fear of
terrorism in the Netherlands offers an analytical advantage. It helps us to address the
Potential problem that what we have observed is not an effect of trust in government on 395
fear, but rather an effect of fear on trust in government. In terms of relational trust, such
a reversed relationship is most likely when a terrorist attack has just occurred and people
tend to rally around the government. Terrorist attacks evoke unusually high levels of fear
among the public, which temporarily increases citizens' affective relationship to govern-
ment in order to reduce feelings of uncertainty.t' At the same time, the fact that 400
authorities could not preyent a terrorist attack from taking place may result in a drop
in calculative trust in government. By contrast, in situations where no recent terrorist
attacks have occurred (such as in the Netherlands), we may expect it least likely that
citizens' fear of terrorism drives either type of trust in government.
Our results show that relational trust is robustly related to less fear of terrorism and 405
tends to increase with higher levels of calculative trust. This has several implications for
security governance. First, risk communication by authorities intended to reduce fear
should take into account trust-building measures. Those trust-building measures could
arguably focus as much on enhancing relational trust as on boosting calculative trust.
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effects will depend partly on citizens' political preferences.s3 It therefore seems more
effective to emphasize strong government performancetn-even more so because recent
evidence suggests that media amplifr state messaging on counterterrorism strengths.8s
Our findings indicate, in line with a recent Belgian study on the effects of trust on citizens'
perception of terrorist threats, that strong emphasis on government performance and 415
public perception of governmental expert efficacy could indeed contribute to both general
trust and fear reduction.86
A second implication concerns information on how authorities combat terrorism. In a recent
study, Aaron Hoffrnan and William Shelby find that citizens who receive information on how
government effectively combats terrorism have more calculative trust in authorities than those 420
who do not receive such information. Those trusting citizens are less likely to show behavioral
avoidance for instance in their willingness to travel. Respondents in their experimental study had
gained trust because they-unlike the control group-received information about how respon-
sible authorities had disrupted terrorist plots.87 Both military and criminal justice counter-
terrorism performance had this effect, while the former produced strongest results. 425
Meanwhile, communicating on counterterrorism did not increase feelings of insecurity among
target audiencesss-a conclusion that contrasts findings on the effects of terrorism warnings8e or
the effects of visible counterterrorism measures such as "guns, guards and gates" in public
places.e0 While both scholars and experts from practice disagree on the propenrlty of th" public
to panic as a consequence of pre-event mitigation and risk communication campaigns,el these 430
findings support the idea that concerns for social harm may be overstated.e2
Hoffman and Shelby warn that the effects on increased calculative trust assume a basic
level of trust in government. Our results seem to suggest instead that calculative trust
precisely mitigates fear because of its impact on relational trust. Yet, despite our careful
case selection, our cross-sectional research design admittedly does not allow us to make 435
firm statements regarding causality. Future studies would ideally use panel survey data or
(quasi-)experimental designs to verifr the causal links between the two types of trust in
government and fear of terrorism. In-depth qualitative case studies could shed light on the
complex causal mechanisms linking various tlpes of trust and fear of terrorism. Practically
speaking, the conclusion remains the same: governments need to communicate proac- 440
tively what they do in combatting terrorism. To increase calculative trust, it makes sense
for public authorities to highlight their successes in disturbing plots, preventing attacks,
and even rePort on what they do to counter radicalization and encourage de-
radicalization. In line with shifts in the intelligence world since the attacks on
September 11, risk communication on terrorism has to move from "need to know," to 445
"responsibility to share."e3
To conclude, relational trust is the basis to build on, but calculative trust can indirectly
help to reduce citizens' fear of terrorism. Even though "the war against terror is potentially
interminable,"ea the mitigation of effects of terrorism can be enhanced by academic
research and policy practice. The implications of the important negative impact of 450
relational trust in mediating the effect of calculative trust will enrich the toolbox of risk
communication and counterterrorism policy makers.
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